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BUT FIRST, (DON’T) LET ME TAKE A SELFIE:
NEW HAMPSHIRE’S BAN ON BALLOT SELFIES
AND FIRST AMENDMENT SCRUTINY
Emily Wagman*
INTRODUCTION
With the 2016 election fast approaching, millions of Americans will be stepping
into voting booths across the country, many for the first time. What better way for
people to commemorate a first-time voting experience than by taking photos of their
ballots? What harm could there be in that? Though one of the bedrock principles of
American democracy is the First Amendment, which protects the freedom of speech,1
and though the Supreme Court has, time and time again, recognized the importance
of political speech in particular,2 there are limits to what the First Amendment
covers.3 For instance, Congress and states can both limit the amount of money in-
dividuals can contribute to political campaigns, and states can protect polling places
from undue influence by prohibiting campaigning within a specified perimeter of
voting booths.4
Undue influence in elections has been a concern in the United States since the
country’s inception and its first elections, and states have instituted a variety of
measures to combat electoral corruption and coercion of voters, including the secret
ballot.5 In 2014, New Hampshire amended RSA 659:35, I,6 its law preventing voters
from showing their ballots to others with the intent to disclose how they plan to
vote, to include a prohibition on taking photos of their marked ballots and sharing
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1 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2 See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957) (“The protection given speech and
press was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of po-
litical and social changes desired by the people.”). See generally Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S.
1 (1976) (per curiam).
3 See, e.g., Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (holding that speech of a nature
used to create a “clear and present danger” is not protected speech under the First Amendment).
4 See, e.g., Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 211 (1992) (holding that a Tennessee law “re-
quiring solicitors to stand 100 feet from the entrances of polling places” was constitutional).
5 See generally Jill Lepore, Rock Paper Scissors, NEW YORKER (Oct. 13, 2008), http://
www.newyorker.com/magazine/2008/10/13/rock-paper-scissors [http://perma.cc/XZ8Z-TC52]
(discussing the history of vote buying, voter coercion, and the adoption of the Australian ballot
in the United States).
6 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 659:35, I (2016).
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them on social media.7 Other states, including Indiana, have prohibited so-called
ballot selfies as well.8 States prohibiting ballot selfies cite interests in preventing
vote buying and voter coercion,9 but are these kinds of photographs actually pro-
tected political speech under the First Amendment?
In August 2015, the U.S. District Court for the District of New Hampshire held
that New Hampshire’s ban on ballot selfies was unconstitutional in Rideout v.
Gardner.10 This was the first time a court had addressed this type of law, and it is
likely that similar litigation will follow in states with similar prohibitions, using the
New Hampshire decision as persuasive authority. However, did the New Hampshire
court get it wrong?
The State pursued a litigation strategy that ultimately addressed the require-
ments of strict scrutiny.11 For a law to survive strict scrutiny analysis, it must further
a “compelling governmental interest,” and the law must be “narrowly tailored . . .
to achieve that interest.”12 The court held that RSA 659:35, I did not withstand strict
scrutiny analysis for reasons that will be addressed later in this Note.13 However,
laws with similar aims have survived strict scrutiny in the past,14 and, subjected to
similar analysis, New Hampshire’s law should have withstood the same level of
scrutiny and been upheld.
This Note is split into five parts. Part I will provide a historical background
regarding vote buying and voter coercion in the United States, introduce Rideout v.
Gardner—New Hampshire’s ballot selfie case—and provide an analysis of Reed v.
Town of Gilbert15—the case that changed the way courts address content-neutral and
content-based legislation.16 Part II will provide an in-depth analysis of the Rideout
court’s application of strict scrutiny before showing that New Hampshire’s law could
actually survive strict scrutiny.17 Parts III, IV, and V will evaluate other methods of
scrutiny and analysis that New Hampshire’s prohibition on ballot selfies would suc-
cessfully withstand, including O’Brien scrutiny, expressive conduct scrutiny, and the
exacting scrutiny utilized in the campaign finances cases.18
7 Rideout v. Gardner, 123 F. Supp. 3d 218, 221 (D.N.H. 2015).
8 Erik Eckholm, Selfies in Voting Booths Raise Legal Questions on Speech and Secrecy,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 24, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/25/us/selfies-in-voting
-booths-raise-legal-questions-on-speech-and-secrecy.html?_r=0.
9 See id.
10 See 123 F. Supp. 3d 218, 235 (D.N.H. 2015).
11 See infra text accompanying notes 99–107.
12 Strict Scrutiny, LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/strict_scrutiny
[http://perma.cc/M26K-CZ65].
13 See infra Part I.C.
14 See, e.g., Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 211 (1992) (holding that a law “requiring
solicitors to stand 100 feet from the entrances to polling places” survives strict scrutiny).
15 135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015).
16 See infra Part I.
17 See infra Part II.
18 See infra Parts III, IV, and V.
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I. VOTE BUYING, RIDEOUT V. GARDNER, AND REED V. TOWN OF GILBERT:
THE INTERSECTION OF AMERICAN HISTORY AND THE JUDICIARY
A. An American History of Vote Buying and Voter Coercion
At first glance, vote buying and voter coercion seem like antiquated concepts
that could never occur in the twenty-first century. However, the United States has
a history of vote buying and voter coercion that started close to the time of the
Founding Fathers and has continued through recent elections in the first two decades
of the twenty-first century.19 With this sweeping history of vote buying and voter
coercion in mind, the state of New Hampshire decided to amend RSA 659:35, I in
an effort to prevent both problems.20
The United States’ history of vote buying and voter coercion began long before
the Australian or secret ballot was introduced to American elections in the late
nineteenth century.21 The new American colonists voted out loud.22 It was not until
1634 that a gubernatorial candidate in Massachusetts was elected using a paper
ballot.23 Because the time, place, and manner of elections is left to the states,24 every
state handled elections differently in the early days of the American Republic.25
Eventually, most states moved toward using a paper ballot, but many did not provide
the ballots themselves—voters had to bring their own paper and write out the names
of their preferred candidates by hand.26 Pre-printed ballots were an innovation of the
late eighteenth century—some partisan voters began bringing them to the polls, and
handed them out with money to voters: “Doling out cash—the money came to be
called ‘soap’—wasn’t illegal; it was getting out the vote.”27
The early nineteenth century saw the innovation of “party tickets” that each
major political party printed out for their voters.28 The ballots were sent to voters in
advance and they would have to bring them to the polls on election day.29 These
party tickets resulted in all sorts of “fraud and intimidation,” with the ballots be-
coming so big and colorful that it was easy to tell which slate of candidates voters
19 See infra text accompanying notes 20–27.
20 See Rideout v. Gardner, 123 F. Supp. 3d 218, 221–22 (D.N.H. 2015) (discussing the
legislative history of the amendment to RSA 659:35, I).
21 Lepore, supra note 5.
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
25 Lepore, supra note 5.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 Id.
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were planning on casting their votes for.30 Ultimately, the instances of voter “fraud
and intimidation” became so commonplace that people wanted a change in the way
they cast their votes.31 Various states attempted to make election day more of a
secret, but many proposed measures failed, because there was a strong feeling that
there was no reason for people to be afraid to publicly announce their votes.32
Ultimately, it was not until the end of the nineteenth century that each state, led
first by New York, adopted the secret, or Australian, ballot.33 The secret ballot was
championed by Henry George, an eventual failed mayoral candidate, after he saw
how corrupt American elections had become.34 In San Francisco, for instance, party
leaders gave out coins worth $2.50 to voters, while in Indiana, voters sold their votes
for “a sandwich, a swig, and a fiver.”35 Perhaps the most egregious instance of elec-
toral corruption came out of New York, where Boss Tweed’s voters managed to cast
over fifty thousand illegal votes in 1868.36 With widespread voter fraud occurring
in many states, it did not take very long for every state to shift to the Australian
ballot.37 Problem solved? Not quite.
30 Id.
31  See id. (explaining that voters began to want to hide their votes).
32 See id. (“[In 1831] Maine required that all ballots be printed on the same color paper,
to protect voters trying to cast minority ballots in a polling place besieged by rowdy members
of the majority. It didn’t do much good. What honest man was ashamed of his vote? . . . In
1851, a Massachusetts legislature dominated by Free Soilers and Democrats mandated the use
of envelopes, to be supplied by the Secretary of State. That didn’t do much good, either . . . . By
the time the House Committee on Elections investigated the contested 1859 Baltimore
congressional election, jostling and brawling at the polls were to be expected and endured.”).
33 Id. Lepore’s article goes somewhat in depth into the history of the secret ballot in
Australia and the United Kingdom. See id. Though not entirely relevant to the issue of voter
coercion in the United States, the international history of the secret ballot plays a role in how
the United States views voting today. See id. The United States was not the first country
outside of Australia to implement the secret ballot electoral system. Id. James Mill advocated
for the secret ballot in Scotland in 1830, in an effort to keep the votes of tenants and factory
workers safe from the dangers of coercion by landlords and factory owners, respectively. Id.
Australia passed an election law with relevant ballot clauses in 1856 that required polling
places to be designed for voters to cast secret ballots. Id. Three years after Australia passed
its secret ballot legislation, James Mill’s son, John Stuart Mill, argued against the secret ballot,
making the claim that, interestingly, voting is not a right, but is rather a trust that implicates
the public interest and should not be secret at all. See id. Mill was ultimately outvoted, with
his opponents making the point that only the secret ballot can protect the less powerful from
being taken advantage of by the more powerful—the electorate is full of people from
different statures and walks of life. See id. Parliament adopted the secret ballot in 1872. Id.
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 See id. (discussing how New York was the last state to switch to the Australian ballot
in 1890).
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Throughout the twentieth century, some states grappled with vote buying and
voter coercion even after the introduction of the secret ballot.38 In Arkansas, for
example, voters exchanged their votes for money and whiskey well into the 1970s.39
Not only were voters bribed but many began voting well before they were of legal
voting age.40 Retired Arkansas Supreme Court Justice Tom Glaze writes that he
became acquainted with Searcy County’s election fraud after the 1976 election.41
Rex Elliot, a member of the Searcy County Republican Committee, admitted to
Justice Glaze that candidates on both sides of the aisle would often raise upwards
of $20,000 to pay voters.42 “Rex estimated that a third of the votes in a typical
general election were bought[ ]” by members of the Republican and Democratic
parties.43 Not only were the candidates involved but, allegedly, both parties had a
collection of judges and clerks involved in the vote buying scheme.44
Ultimately, Glaze filed a federal lawsuit, with eighty-eight residents of Searcy
County serving as plaintiffs.45 His trial did not go as planned, though, because one
of the attorneys for the defendants and others involved in the scheme had advised
everyone to use their Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.46 While
Justice Glaze’s trial did not actually come to fruition, it led to changes in how the
citizens of Searcy County voted.47 Justice Glaze’s story ends, though, with a disqui-
eting thought: “The people of Searcy County got reasonably honest elections in
1976 and 1978 and they were happy about it, but I would not warrant that votes
were never sold again.”48
Justice Glaze’s prediction that votes were sold again after the 1976 elections
came true in multiple states.49 In United States v. Shatley,50 “[d]uring the election
campaign before the November 2002 general election in Caldwell County, North Caro-
lina, Wayne Shatley and four others engaged in a widespread scheme to buy votes
for the Republican candidate for sheriff, Gary Clark.”51 Shatley organized and financed
38 See infra text accompanying notes 39–63.
39 Tom Glaze, The Day the Vote-Buying Stopped, ARK. TIMES (June 29, 2011), http://
www.arktimes.com/arkansas/the-day-the-vote-buying-stopped/Content?oid=1837617 [http://
perma.cc/Y354-8DWZ].
40 See id. (discussing how election judges permitted anyone who showed up to the polls
to cast a vote).
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 See id. (describing the decree that resulted from Judge Glaze’s lawsuit and the conduct
it proscribed).
48 Id.
49 See infra text accompanying notes 50–58.
50 448 F.3d 264 (4th Cir. 2006).
51 Id. at 266.
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the scheme with his own money, using somewhere between $5,000 and $6,000 to
pay voters approximately $25 a piece for voting for his preferred candidate.52
In United States v. Thomas,53 “[t]he defendants in this case—four Democratic
precinct committeemen in East St. Louis, Illinois—were convicted” of engaging in
a vote-buying scheme in the 2004 election.54 The defendants were all heard discuss-
ing paying voters between $5 and $10 to vote for Democratic candidates,55 and a
witness testified that she saw one of the defendants personally paying voters on
election day.56
In United States v. Johnson,57 Naomi Johnson and another defendant, Earl
Young, were indicted for conspiracy to buy votes and vote buying.58 At their trial,
the Government presented evidence that during early voting for the May 2010
primary, more absentee votes than usual were cast on one particular day in Breathitt
County, Kentucky.59 The owner of Salyers’ Grocery Store testified that vote buying
was a common occurrence in Breathitt—people would offer to sell their votes to him
because he was allegedly buying.60 What the facts did not elaborate on, however, is
how the voters provided proof to Salyers and the defendants of how they voted. Was
it an honor system? Or did the voters have to have tangible proof? Because this
instance of vote buying occurred in 2010, it is likely that many of the voters had the
means to take photos of their marked ballots as proof, almost like a receipt.
In 1965, Congress passed 52 U.S.C. § 10307, which addresses prohibited acts.61
Subsection (b) of § 10307 states:
Intimidation, threats, or coercion. No person, whether acting
under color of law or otherwise, shall intimidate, threaten, or co-
erce, or attempt to intimidate, threaten, or coerce any person for
voting or attempting to vote, or intimidate, threaten, or coerce,
or attempt to intimidate, threaten, or coerce any person for urg-
ing or aiding any person to vote or attempt to vote, or intimidate,
52 Id.
53 510 F.3d 714 (7th Cir. 2007).
54 Id. at 716.
55 Id. at 719.
56 Id. at 720.
57 No. 5:11-CR-143, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117777 (E.D. Ky. Aug. 21, 2012).
58 Id. at *1.
59 Id. at *2.
60 Id. The Breathitt County vote buying scheme worked as follows: some voters would
go to Salyers’ store and offer to sell their votes, while others would have their votes solicited
in exchange for money. Id. at *2–3. Once the arrangements were made, Salyers would have
someone bring the voter to the polls. Id. at *3. After the person voted, Salyers would pay him
or her somewhere between $20 and $25 for voting a certain way. Id.
61 52 U.S.C. § 10307 (2016).
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threaten, or coerce any person for exercising any powers or
duties under section 10302(a), 10305, 10306, or 10308(e) of this
title . . . .62
At the state level, New Hampshire has comparable legislation that prohibits vote
buying and voter coercion,63 but are federal and state laws prohibiting vote buying
and voter coercion enough to prevent people from engaging in these sorts of schemes?
The evidence from Arkansas, North Carolina, Kentucky, and Illinois suggests that
these laws might not be enough.64 With concerns of vote buying and voter coercion
in mind, the New Hampshire legislature passed its statutory ban on voters taking
photos of their marked ballots and putting them on social media.65
B. Rideout v. Gardner—Facts of the Case
In 2014, the New Hampshire State Legislature amended RSA 659:35, I to add
the prohibition on ballot selfies.66 The amended statute reads:
No voter shall allow his or her ballot to be seen by any
person with the intention of letting it be known how he or she is
about to vote or how he or she has voted except as provided in
RSA 659:20. This prohibition shall include taking a digital
image or photograph of his or her marked ballot and distributing
or sharing the image via social media or by any other means.67
The legislative history of the amendment noted only one actual alleged instance of
vote buying in New Hampshire: Representative Till stated that
62 § 10307(b).
63 See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 659:37–40, III (2016).
64 See supra text accompanying notes 37–58.
65 See Rideout v. Gardner, 123 F. Supp. 3d 218, 221–23 (D.N.H. 2015).
66 See id. at 221.
67 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 659:35, I (2016), invalidated by Rideout v. Gardner, 123 F.
Supp. 3d 218 (D.N.H. 2015). The code section mentioned in RSA 659:35, I, 659:20, reads:
Any voter who declares to the moderator under oath that said voter
needs assistance marking his or her ballot shall, upon the voter’s choice
and request after the moderator has informed the voter of the accessible
voting options that are available at the polling place, receive the
assistance of one or both of the inspectors of election . . . or of a person
of the voter’s choice provided that the person is not the voter’s em-
ployer or union official.
§ 659:20.
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[she] was told by a Goffstown resident that he knew for a fact
that one of the major parties paid students from St[.] Anselm’s
$50 to vote in the 2012 election. [She didn’t] know whether that
[was] true or not, but [she did] know that if [she] were going to
pay someone to vote a particular way, [she] would want proof
that they actually voted that way.68
After the New Hampshire legislature enacted the prohibition, the New Hamp-
shire Attorney General’s Office investigated four people for violating RSA 659:35,
I.69 Three of the four investigated individuals became the plaintiffs in this case.70
Leon Rideout, a member of the New Hampshire House of Representatives (R–Coos
County), took a photo of his marked ballot that showed that he voted for himself and
other Republican candidates.71 He then posted the photo on Twitter, and on his
Facebook page, to make a statement that he believed RSA 659:35, I was unconstitu-
tional.72 Andrew Langlois took a photo of his ballot after writing in the name of his
deceased dog, Akira.73 He posted the photo to Facebook with the caption: “Because
all of the candidates SUCK, I did a write-in of Akira . . . .”74 Brandon Ross, a
candidate for the New Hampshire House of Representatives, voted for himself in
Manchester, and took a photo of his ballot to mark the occasion.75 Because he was
aware of the prohibition on posting ballot selfies, he waited to post it.76 When Ross
heard that other voters were being investigated under RSA 659:35, I he posted the
photo on Facebook with the caption: “Come at me, bro.”77
The three plaintiffs challenged the part of RSA 659:35, I that prohibits taking
photos of marked ballots and disclosing them.78 They argued that posting their ballot
selfies was “an important and effective means of political expression . . . protected
by the First Amendment.”79 Secretary Gardner, on the other hand, argued that the
law was necessary “to prevent vote buying and voter coercion.”80
68 Rideout, 123 F. Supp. 3d at 224 (quoting Exhibit G to the Declaration of Gilles
Bissonnette, Esquire in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment at 000064,
Rideout v. Gardner, 123 F. Supp. 3d 218 (D.N.H. 2015) (No. 14-cv-489-PB)).
69 Id. at 226.
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 Id. (quoting David Brooks, You Didn’t Take a Picture of Your Ballot Tuesday, Did
You? (It’s Illegal), TELEGRAPH (Sept. 11, 2014), http://www.nashuatelegraph.com/news
/1046026-469/you-didnt-take-a-picture-of-your.html [http://perma.cc/JK9H-EG5V]).
73 Id. at 226–27.
74 Id. at 227.
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 Id. at 228 (internal quotation marks omitted).
79 Id.
80 Id.
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Even though New Hampshire only had the one alleged instance of vote buying,
Part I of this Note shows that there is a history of vote buying and voter coercion in
the United States with cases occurring into the twenty-first century.81 With that his-
torical background likely motivating the New Hampshire State Legislature, it should
have followed that the District Court would have upheld RSA 659:35, I using
rational basis scrutiny, because the prohibition looked content-neutral on its face.82
However, the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Reed v. Town of Gilbert expanded
the definition of content-based restrictions, which expanded the kinds of statutes
subject to strict scrutiny analysis.83
1. Reed v. Town of Gilbert—The Supreme Court’s Update on Content-Based
Restrictions
Reed v. Town of Gilbert came about when Good News Community Church
(Church) and its pastor, Clyde Reed, wanted to advertise their church services.84 The
Church placed between fifteen and twenty signs around Gilbert on Saturdays, and
removed them after services on Sundays.85 Gilbert, however, had a sign code that
prohibited the display of outdoor signs in the town without a permit, but exempted
several categories of signs from that requirement, including ideological signs, po-
litical signs, and temporary directional signs for a qualifying event.86 Qualifying
events included any “assembly, gathering, activity, or meeting sponsored, arranged,
or promoted by a religious, charitable, community service, educational, or other
similar non-profit organization.”87 Gilbert cited the Church twice for placing signs
around town that did not fall into the exempted categories, and the Church filed a
claim in federal court arguing that Gilbert had violated its freedom of speech.88
When the case made it to the United States Supreme Court, the majority expanded
the definition of content-based restrictions.89 Prior to this case, “[t]he court used to
say laws were content-based if they were adopted to suppress speech with which
the government disagreed.”90 Justice Thomas, however, stated that “[g]overnment
81 See supra text accompanying notes 19–60.
82 Rational Basis, LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/rational_basis
[http://perma.cc/ZP2U-BCUQ].
83 Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015).
84 Id. at 2225.
85 Id.
86 Id. at 2224–25.
87 Id. at 2225.
88 Id. at 2225–26.
89 Id. at 2227.
90 Adam Liptak, Court’s Free-Speech Expansion Has Far-Reaching Consequences, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 17, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/18/us/politics/courts-free-speech
-expansion-has-far-reaching-consequences.html.
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regulation of speech is content based if a law applies to particular speech because
of the topic discussed or the idea or message expressed.”91 The ultimate effect of the
majority opinion in Reed, wrote Judge Easterbrook, was to “abolish[ ] any distinc-
tion between content regulation and subject-matter regulation.”92
C. Reed v. Town of Gilbert’s Impact on Rideout v. Gardner
Prior to Reed, it is likely that the district court would have applied the intermediate
scrutiny analysis used for content-neutral restrictions on speech, since RSA 659:35,
I regulated photos of marked ballots in general, not the content of those ballots.93
Had the district court used intermediate scrutiny, it would have analyzed RSA
659:35, I to determine whether the statute furthered an important governmental
interest in a way that was substantially related to that interest.94 As long as the law
was narrowly tailored to serve a significant interest and left open alternative means
of communication, it would have survived intermediate scrutiny.95
The district court’s opinion references Reed in finding that the law at issue in
New Hampshire was content-based:
In the present case, as in Reed, the law under review is content
based on its face because it restricts speech on the basis of its
subject matter. The only . . . photographic images that are barred
by RSA 659:35, I are images of marked ballots that are intended
to disclose how a voter has voted. . . . Accordingly, like the sign
code at issue in Reed, the law under review here is subject to
strict scrutiny . . . .96
In short, because RSA 659:35, I regulated what kind of photo could be posted on
social media, it was a content-based regulation.97 For a law to survive strict scrutiny,
it must further a compelling governmental interest and be narrowly tailored.98
91 Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2227.
92 Liptak, supra note 90 (quoting Norton v. City of Springfield, 806 F.3d 411, 412 (7th
Cir. 2015)).
93 See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 659:35, I (containing the language of the statute). Phrased
another way, had RSA 659:35, I regulated which photos of marked ballots were allowed to
be posted on social media (i.e., only photos of write-in ballots), that would have been a
content-based regulation.
94 Intermediate Scrutiny, LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/intermedi
ate_scrutiny [http://perma.cc/PLN7-3TVU].
95 Strict Scrutiny, supra note 12.
96 Rideout v. Gardner, 123 F. Supp. 3d 218, 229 (D.N.H. 2015).
97 Id.
98 Id. at 231.
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New Hampshire tried various means of persuading the court to use a lower level
of scrutiny, but all of its proposed arguments ultimately failed.99 Secretary Gardner
first tried to argue that RSA 659:35, I was only a “partial ban” on speech, since it
did not entirely prevent voters from letting others know how they voted.100 Follow-
ing Secretary Gardner’s argument101 to its logical conclusion, because the state left
open other means of communication, RSA 659:35, I should have been subject to
intermediate scrutiny rather than strict scrutiny. The district court, however cited the
U.S. Supreme Court in noting that “[t]he distinction between laws burdening and
laws banning speech is but a matter of degree. The Government’s content-based
burdens must satisfy the same rigorous scrutiny as its content-based bans.”102
Secretary Gardner also made the argument that RSA 659:35, I was not content-
based because 659:35, II prevents voters from putting any sort of identifying mark
on their ballots, and that because there were two separate bans relating to marked
ballots in the code section, it was content-neutral.103 The court noted, however, that
the two sections of 659:35 regulate two different kinds of speech—speech outside
the polling place and speech inside the polling place.104
Finally, Secretary Gardner argued that marked ballots are actually government
speech, citing Walker v. Texas Division, Sons of Confederate Veterans.105 In Walker,
the Supreme Court held that license plates are government speech for three reasons:
“ (1) license plates ‘long have communicated messages from the States,’ (2) Texas
license plate designs ‘are often closely identified in the public mind with the State,’
and (3) Texas maintains direct control over the messages conveyed on its specialty
plates.”106 Although this was a creative argument, it failed in court because “ballots
do not communicate messages from the state[,] . . . there is no possibility that a
voter’s marking on a ballot will be misinterpreted as state speech[,] . . . [and] New
Hampshire does not maintain direct control over the messages that people convey
on ballots . . . .”107 So, RSA 659:35, I could not be considered government speech.
Though the court recognized that New Hampshire’s interest in preventing vote
buying and voter coercion were “compelling in the abstract,”108 the state did not
show that there was an actual problem addressed by the statutory ban on ballot
selfies.109 The one anecdotal piece of evidence of vote buying offered in the legisla-
tive history of RSA 659:35, I was not enough to prove that New Hampshire has a
99 See infra notes 100–07 and accompanying text.
100 Rideout, 123 F. Supp. 3d at 229.
101 Id. at 229–30.
102 Id. at 230 (quoting United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 812 (2000)).
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 Id. (citing 135 S. Ct. 2239 (2015)).
106 Id. (quoting Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2248–49).
107 Id.
108 Id. at 231.
109 Id. (citing Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2738 (2011)).
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current problem with vote buying and voter coercion.110 The plaintiffs, on the other
hand, presented evidence that there had been no recorded cases or prosecutions of
vote buying and voter coercion since 1976.111 The historical showing of vote buying
and voter coercion throughout the United States was not enough to show that New
Hampshire itself has, or ever had, a problem with either of its stated interests.112
Moreover, RSA 659:35, I was not narrowly tailored.113 In the strict scrutiny of
content-based regulations, “the burden is on the state to demonstrate that the restric-
tion it has adopted is the ‘least restrictive means’ available to achieve the stated
objective.”114 The amended RSA 659:35, I was not narrowly tailored because it was
likely to punish people who were not participating in vote buying or voter co-
ercion.115 The plaintiffs in this case, for instance, placed photos of their marked
ballots on social media to make a point—they were not engaged in vote-buying
schemes.116 Thus, because RSA 659:35, I did not further a sufficiently compelling
interest and was not narrowly tailored, it could not survive strict scrutiny, and the
court held that the statutory prohibition on ballot selfies was unconstitutional under
the First Amendment.117
II. SURVIVING STRICT SCRUTINY
A. Burson v. Freeman
As Rideout v. Gardner shows, strict scrutiny is often fatal. However, laws meant
to protect the electoral process can, and do, survive strict scrutiny.118 In Burson v.
Freeman,119 Freeman, the treasurer for a campaign, filed suit claiming that Tennessee
Code § 2-7-111(b), which provides that campaigners cannot solicit votes or display
campaign materials within 100 feet of the entrance to a polling place,120 violated the
First and Fourteenth Amendments.121 Though the Davidson County Chancery Court
dismissed Freeman’s suit,122 the Tennessee Supreme Court held that Tennessee had
110 Id. at 232.
111 Id.
112 Id.
113 Id. at 233.
114 Id.
115 Id. at 234 (citing Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 666 (2004)).
116 See supra notes 70–76 and accompanying text.
117 Rideout, 123 F. Supp. 3d at 235.
118 See Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 211 (1992) (upholding a law that required so-
licitors to stand at least 100 feet from polling places).
119 504 U.S. 191 (1992)
120 TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-7-111(b) (1972).
121 Burson, 504 U.S. at 193.
122 Id. at 194.
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a compelling interest in preventing these activities within polling places, but not
outside them.123 The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the Tennessee State Supreme
Court’s decision and upheld Tennessee’s restriction on campaigning within 100 feet
of a polling place.124
Because Tennessee’s law was a content-based restriction on political speech, it
was subject to strict scrutiny.125 The State argued two compelling interests: “its regu-
lation serve[d] its compelling interest in protecting the right of its citizens to vote
freely for the candidates of their choice[,]”126 and “its restriction protect[ed] the right
to vote in an election conducted with integrity and reliability.”127 Citing Reynolds v.
Sims,128 the Court recognized that the first interest was compelling: “the ‘right to vote
freely for the candidate of one’s choice is of the essence of a democratic society.’”129
Citing Anderson v. Celebrezze,130 the Court also held that there is a recognized
compelling interest in making sure that the right to vote is not “undermined by fraud
in the election process.”131
The Court noted that it is not enough for a state to have compelling interests;
Tennessee had to demonstrate that its regulation was necessary to further its inter-
ests.132 After looking at the history of voter intimidation and election fraud, both in
Tennessee and the United States as a whole, the Court held that Tennessee’s inter-
ests were furthered by the campaign-free zone at issue.133 The Court pointed to the
fact that Tennessee’s original 1897 Act regulating the electoral process “made it a
misdemeanor to commit various election offenses, including the use of bribery,
violence, or intimidation in order to induce a person to vote or refrain from voting
for any particular person or measure.”134 Ultimately, this sounds familiar—bribery
to induce a person to vote is essentially vote buying.
Perhaps most important is the Court’s narrow tailoring analysis of Tennessee’s
law.135 Freeman argued that the 100-foot boundary proscribed by the law was not
narrowly tailored to properly achieve Tennessee’s stated interests,136 but the Court
disagreed:
123 Id. at 195.
124 Id. at 211.
125 Id. at 207.
126 Id. at 198.
127 Id. at 199.
128 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
129 Burson, 504 U.S. at 199 (quoting Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 555).
130 460 U.S. 780 (1983).
131 Burson, 504 U.S. at 199.
132 Id.
133 Id. at 206.
134 Id. at 205.
135 Id. at 199–211.
136 Id. at 208.
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[B]ecause a government has such a compelling interest in secur-
ing the right to vote freely and effectively, this Court never has
held a State ‘to the burden of demonstrating empirically the
objective effects on political stability that [are] produced’ by the
voting regulation in question. . . . Thus, requiring proof that a
100-foot boundary is perfectly tailored to deal with voter intimi-
dation and election fraud ‘would necessitate that a State’s politi-
cal system sustain some level of damage before the legislature
could take corrective action. Legislatures . . . should be permit-
ted to respond to potential deficiencies in the electoral process
with foresight rather than reactively, provided that the response
is reasonable and does not significantly impinge on constitution-
ally protected rights.’137
Tennessee’s 100-foot campaign-free zone ultimately withstood the second part of
the strict scrutiny analysis, especially because any change in size would just be a
change in degree rather than a less restrictive alternative.138
Ultimately, the Court recognized that Burson v. Freeman was one of those rare
cases where a state’s regulation can withstand strict scrutiny.139 Though the First
Amendment conflicted with the campaign-free zone, “[a] long history, a substantial
consensus, and simple common sense show that some restricted zone around polling
places is necessary to protect [the right to cast a ballot in an election free from the
taint of intimidation and fraud].”140
B. Compelling Governmental Interests
Although the Rideout court made an effort to distinguish Burson from Rideout,141
the two cases have more similarities than differences. The court noted that the
amended RSA 659:35, I is extremely new, and as such cannot be connected to recent
instances of voter fraud.142 In contrast, Tennessee’s law was just one of many state laws
that had been enacted to prevent voter coercion and fraud, so it was acceptable and
right for Tennessee to act without evidence of current voter fraud and intimidation.143
However, it is difficult to draw a bright line between Tennessee’s regulation and
New Hampshire’s as they both attempt to further extremely similar governmental
137 Id. at 208–09 (second alteration in original) (quoting Munroe v. Socialist Workers
Party, 479 U.S. 189, 195 (1986)).
138 Id. at 210.
139 Id. at 211.
140 Id.
141 Rideout v. Gardner, 123 F. Supp. 3d 218, 233 (D.N.H. 2015).
142 Id.
143 Id. (discussing the Court’s holding in Burson v. Freeman).
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objectives.144 Ultimately, preventing vote buying and voter coercion and protecting
the right of voters to freely vote for the candidate of their choice in an election “con-
ducted with integrity and reliability”145 are two sides of the same coin. If voters feel
that there is the possibility of vote buying and voter coercion, they are likely to feel
that the election is not being conducted with integrity and reliability. Moreover, a
financial incentive to vote a certain way might mean that a voter is not truly free to
vote for the candidate of his or her choice.
Further, New Hampshire’s interests are compelling in reality, as well as in the
abstract, despite the lack of concrete evidence of fraud. In Crawford v. Marion County
Election Board,146 the U.S. Supreme Court held that Indiana’s interest in preventing
in-person voter impersonation was valid, even though there was no evidence of that
type of voter fraud occurring in Indiana’s history.147 Although that was the case, “[i]t
remains true . . . that flagrant examples of such fraud in other parts of the country
have been documented throughout this Nation’s history by respected historians and
journalists [and] that occasional examples have surfaced in recent years . . . .”148 This
suggests that “the risk of voter fraud [is] real [and] that it could affect the outcome of
a close election.”149 The Crawford Court did not use strict scrutiny to analyze Indiana’s
voter ID law.150 However, the fact that the Court held that Indiana’s interest in pre-
venting voter fraud was legitimate and important without concrete evidence of voter
fraud actually occurring shows that New Hampshire’s interests in preventing vote
buying and voter coercion should be compelling in reality, and not just in the abstract.
Moreover, there were no recorded instances of vote buying and voter coercion
after New Hampshire amended RSA 659:35, I showing that the law was actually
working.151 The court’s analysis is reminiscent of Justice Ginsburg’s dissent in Shelby
County v. Holder.152 Ginsburg argued that sections 4 and 5 of the Voting Rights Act
were still necessary to prevent racial discrimination in the voting process:153 “Ginsburg
said that getting rid of this part of the act while it appeared to be effective in stopping
144 Compare id. at 231 (purported state interests were “perverting vote buying and voter
coercion”), with Burson, 504 U.S. at 198–99 (purported state interests were protecting the
right of citizens to vote freely and conducting elections with “integrity and reliability”).
145 Burson, 504 U.S. at 199.
146 553 U.S. 181 (2008).
147 Id. at 194, 196.
148 Id. at 195.
149 Id. at 196.
150 Id. at 191.
151 See Richard L. Hasen, Why the Selfie Is a Threat to Democracy, REUTERS (Aug. 18,
2015), http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2015/08/17/why-the-selfie-is-a-threat-to-democ
racy/ [http://perma.cc/LZW4-EFZY] (discussing New Hampshire’s ballot selfie law and
drawing comparisons between the analysis in Reed v. Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015) and
Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013)).
152 Id. (discussing Justice Ginsburg’s dissent in Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612
(2013)).
153 Shelby Cty., 133 S. Ct. at 2632–33 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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racial discrimination ‘is like throwing away your umbrella in a rainstorm because
you are not getting wet.’”154
New Hampshire’s prohibition on posting ballot selfies on social media did coin-
cide with a lack of prosecutions in New Hampshire for vote buying.155 In contrast,
there are other states that still prosecute individuals for participating in vote-buying
schemes.156 This shows that New Hampshire’s interest in preventing vote buying and
voter coercion is not only compelling in the abstract, but in reality as well. Ulti-
mately, RSA 659:35, I, clearly worked.
C. Narrow Tailoring
For New Hampshire’s statutory prohibition on ballot selfies to survive strict
scrutiny, not only do the government’s interests have to be compelling, but the
regulation has to be narrowly tailored as well.157 The crucial section of Burson v.
Freeman for New Hampshire’s success in defending RSA 659:35, I comes in the
Court’s discussion of narrow tailoring, as cited above.158 The Burson Court refer-
ences Munro v. Socialist Workers Party159 in its analysis of Tennessee’s campaign-
free zone.160 Munro held that the State of Washington had the right to require candi-
dates to receive at least one percent of the vote in the primary before the candidate
could be listed on the ballot for the general election.161
The portion of Munro that the Burson Court cites is actually tailored nicely to
New Hampshire’s legislation.162 Given that legislatures should be allowed to respond
proactively, rather than reactively, to possible problems with the electoral process,
New Hampshire’s statutory prohibition on posting ballot selfies to social media is
the sort of “corrective action”163 that both the Munro Court and the Burson Court
had in mind when upholding Washington’s and Tennessee’s election restrictions—
both of which also implicated the First Amendment.164
In their Memorandum of Law in Support of Their Motion for Summary Judgment,
the plaintiffs in Rideout v. Gardner argued that the amended RSA 659:35, I was not
narrowly tailored, but rather was overly broad, because it restricted constitutionally
154 Hasen, supra note 151 (quoting Shelby Cty., 133 S. Ct. at 2650 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)).
155 Rideout v. Gardner, 123 F. Supp. 3d 218, 224 (D.N.H. 2015) (explaining that there has
been no evidenced instance of vote buying in New Hampshire since the late nineteenth century).
156 See supra notes 39–62 and accompanying text.
157 Rideout, 123 F. Supp. 3d at 231 (citing Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2231
(2015)).
158 See supra text accompanying notes 132–37.
159 479 U.S. 189 (1986).
160 Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 208–09 (1992) (citing Munro, 479 U.S. at 195).
161 Munro, 479 U.S. at 190.
162 Burson, 504 U.S. at 208–09 (citing id. at 195).
163 Munro, 479 U.S. at 195.
164 See Burson, 504 U.S. 191; Munro, 479 U.S. 189.
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protected political speech.165 As amended, RSA 659:35, I prohibited speech: “(i) far
beyond the polling place, (ii) indefinitely after the date of the election, and (iii) with-
out any nexus to vote corruption”166 because of the statute’s direct application to
online speech.167 However, there is nothing in New Hampshire’s law that prevents
a voter from posting a status update on Facebook saying that she voted for Hillary
Clinton, or a voter from posting a tweet on Twitter saying “I voted! #feelthebern.”168
So, there are endless alternative means of announcing how someone votes on social
media, but there is only one way of providing proof of one’s vote to a vote buyer.
It follows that New Hampshire’s law is as narrowly tailored as it has to be to prevent
vote-buying schemes and voter coercion from occurring.
Ultimately, New Hampshire’s statutory prohibition on posting ballot selfies
online, like Tennessee’s 100-foot campaign-free zone, might not have been perfectly
tailored to handle its interests in preventing voter coercion and vote buying.169 But
that’s just fine. With the advent of the secret ballot, it became almost impossible to
prove how a voter voted on election day. Gone were the days of the massive, brightly
colored party tickets and the days of being able to actually watch someone vote.
Instead, vote buyers and sellers had to turn to different means of proving how the
sellers voted so they could get paid. Though the recent cases of vote buying rely
more on verbal and recorded audio evidence,170 it is not hard to imagine a scenario
where someone would be able to use a photo of his or her ballot as proof that he or
she voted a certain way.
In sum, RSA 659:35, I should be able to withstand strict scrutiny under an
analysis similar to that used in Burson v. Freeman. Munro, Burson, and Crawford
v. Marion County Election Board all provide support for the idea that a state does
not need to have concrete evidence of something like vote buying and voter coercion
occurring recently to want to proactively handle future threats to its electoral
system.171 Professor Richard Hasen lends support to this analysis as well in drawing
the connection between Rideout and Shelby County.172 As Doug Chapin, the director
of the University of Minnesota’s program for excellence in election administration
so succinctly stated: “[B]allot selfies create a vulnerability in the election process
that vastly outweighs any societal or personal benefit the selfie brings . . . . Perhaps
165 Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law in Support of Their Motion for Summary Judgment
at 3, Rideout v. Gardner, 123 F. Supp. 3d 218 (D.N.H. 2015) (No. 1:14-cv-00489-PB).
166 Id. at 35.
167 Id. at 37.
168 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 659:35, I (2016).
169 Burson, 504 U.S. at 209–11.
170 See supra notes 39–60 and accompanying text.
171 See Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 181–82 (2008); Burson, 504
U.S. at 191–92; Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189, 189 (1986).
172 See Hasen, supra note 151 (discussing Justice Ginsburg’s distaste for eradicating a law
because there is no current evidence of the harm the law seeks to prevent).
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that’s generational, but I think it’s something worth thinking—and worrying—about
going forward.”173
Even though New Hampshire’s statutory prohibition on posting ballot selfies on
social media should withstand strict scrutiny, it is important to analyze it under other
levels of scrutiny as well, especially because a ballot selfie is an example of speech
that can be analyzed under the O’Brien intermediate scrutiny test.174 Further, the
political speech implicated in ballot selfies lends itself well to a comparison with
another form of political speech—campaign contributions. The next three sections
will deal with O’Brien scrutiny, expressive conduct’s intermediate level scrutiny,
and the exacting scrutiny analysis called for in Buckley v. Valeo.175
III. BALLOT SELFIES UNDER O’BRIEN
Framing RSA 659:35, I as a law regulating a combination of speech and
nonspeech elements would lead to the use of a lower level of scrutiny.176 Filling out
a ballot, taking a photo of it, and posting it on social media is a combination of
speech and nonspeech elements, similar to the draft card burning at issue in United
States v. O’Brien.177 In O’Brien, the defendant was convicted for setting his draft
card on fire in violation of the 1965 amendment to the Universal Military Training
and Service Act of 1948, which prohibited the destruction of draft cards.178 He
argued that the prohibition on the destruction of draft cards was unconstitutional
because it violated his First Amendment freedom of speech.179 The Court upheld the
prohibition on the destruction of draft cards using a specific intermediate scrutiny
test for acts involving a combination of speech and nonspeech elements.180
While O’Brien argued that the 1965 Amendment was unconstitutional because
it impeded his protected symbolic speech,181 the Court noted that “when ‘speech’
and ‘nonspeech’ elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently
important governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element can justify
incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms.”182 With that in mind, the
Court went on to hold that
[A] government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the
constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important
173 Eckholm, supra note 8.
174 United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
175 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam); see infra Parts III, IV, V.A.
176 See O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 376.
177 319 U.S. 367, 369, 372 (1968) (describing the facts of the case).
178 Id. at 369–70.
179 Id. at 376.
180 Id. at 377.
181 Id. at 376.
182 Id.
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or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest
is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the
incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no
greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.183
Under this test, the federal prohibition on the destruction of draft cards was constitu-
tional,184 and New Hampshire’s ban on posting ballot selfies to social media would
likely be constitutional as well.
As in O’Brien, New Hampshire’s ban on posting ballot selfies to social media
implicates both speech and nonspeech elements.185 The act of posting the photo itself
is arguably nonspeech, while any sort of caption explaining why the poster voted the
way he or she did is more like actual speech. Under the O’Brien test, New Hamp-
shire’s prohibition on ballot selfies would survive and ultimately be upheld.186
The first part of the test, whether the regulation is within the constitutional
power of the government,187 is easily satisfied. All states, including New Hampshire,
have the power under the U.S. Constitution to regulate the time, place, and manner
of elections,188 and preventing the posting of ballot selfies falls comfortably within
that state power.
The second part of the O’Brien test, whether the regulation furthers a substantial
or important governmental interest,189 is satisfied by New Hampshire as well. The
state’s interest in preventing vote buying and voter coercion is certainly both
substantial and important, especially since the U.S. Supreme Court identified pre-
venting voter intimidation as a compelling state interest in Burson v. Freeman.190 If
an interest is compelling, then it is clearly substantial and important as well. New
Hampshire would likely have an easier time making an O’Brien claim because the
District Court was unsympathetic to the idea that preventing vote buying and voter
coercion were compelling interests in reality, and not just in the abstract.191 Because
New Hampshire does not have a recent, localized history of vote buying and voter
coercion,192 it would be easier for the state to argue that its interests are either
substantial or important.
183 Id. at 377.
184 Id. at 386.
185 See, e.g., Rideout v. Gardner, 123 F. Supp. 3d 218, 226 (D.N.H. 2015) (discussing
plaintiff Rideout’s conduct of posting a photo of his ballot to Twitter—which is arguably
nonspeech—and including a textual caption—which is clearly speech).
186 See infra notes 187–203 and accompanying text.
187 O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 377.
188 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
189 O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 377.
190 504 U.S. 191, 199 (1992).
191 Rideout v. Gardner,123 F. Supp. 3d 218, 232–33 (D.N.H. 2015).
192 Id.
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The third and fourth parts of the O’Brien test, whether “the governmental
interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression”193 and whether “the inci-
dental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essen-
tial to the furtherance of th[at] [government’s] interest,”194 would also be satisfied
by New Hampshire. In O’Brien, the government’s interest in protecting the Selective
Service System was unrelated to the suppression of free expression because O’Brien
was prosecuted based on the nonspeech element of his conduct—the burning of the
draft card itself—and not the meaning behind why he chose to publicly burn it as a
protest against the Vietnam War.195 Further, O’Brien had alternative means of pro-
testing the Vietnam War that were not impacted by the government’s interest in
keeping the Selective Service System running smoothly, so any restriction of his First
Amendment right to free speech was not overly broad.196
New Hampshire’s prohibition on posting ballot selfies is somewhat more com-
plicated than O’Brien because two of the plaintiffs had been prosecuted for posting
photos of their marked ballots in protest of New Hampshire’s law.197 However, it is
still the case that New Hampshire’s interest in preventing voters from posting photos
of their marked ballots on social media is unrelated to the suppression of free
expression because the state is trying to prevent vote buying and voter coercion.
Here, the state would have the strongest argument against the plaintiff who voted for
his recently deceased dog because his reasons for posting the photo on social media
were to protest the perceived lack of good candidates, not to protest the law itself.198
Ultimately, though, all three plaintiffs, like O’Brien, were prosecuted for the
nonspeech element of New Hampshire’s law because they posted the photos of their
marked ballots to Facebook.199 The state was not concerned with why the plaintiffs
posted the photos, just that they did, which implicates the nonspeech, rather than the
speech, element of the course of conduct.
New Hampshire’s restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater
than is essential to the furtherance of the government’s interest200 because it leaves
open a variety of alternative channels for voters to discuss how and why they voted a
certain way. There is nothing in New Hampshire’s law that stops voters from posting
Facebook statuses about why they chose to vote the way they did, or from speaking
privately with friends and family about how they voted.201 All New Hampshire’s law
193 O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 377.
194 Id.
195 Id. at 382.
196 See id. (describing the purpose of the 1965 Amendment and explaining that O’Brien
was condemned only for his non-communicative acts).
197 Rideout, 123 F. Supp. 3d at 226–27.
198 See id. at 227 (describing the photograph the plaintiff posted to Facebook and the
caption that accompanied the picture).
199 Id. at 226–27.
200 See O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 377 (laying out the O’Brien factors).
201 See supra text accompanying note 65.
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prevents is posting photos of filled-out ballots on social media,202 so there are a
variety of alternative methods of discussing why a voter chose to vote the way he
or she did.
In sum, under the O’Brien test for courses of conduct that have both speech and
nonspeech elements, like the conduct New Hampshire banned in its prohibition on
ballot selfies, RSA 659:35, I would survive the type of intermediate scrutiny used
by the U.S. Supreme Court in O’Brien.203
IV. EXPRESSIVE ACTS
The U.S. Supreme Court has defined an expressive act as one with the intent to
convey a particularized message where there is a high likelihood that, in context, the
message will be understood by an audience.204 If speech is expressive, then the
government has to show a compelling interest to limit the speech.205 The Court
explicitly addressed the issue of expressive conduct in Spence v. Washington.206 In
Spence, the defendant/appellant was convicted under Washington’s improper use
statute207 after being arrested for hanging a U.S. flag upside down, with a peace sign
fashioned from black adhesive tape attached to both the front and back of the flag.208
Spence hung the flag in his window as a protest against United States action in
Cambodia and the Kent State shooting.209
The U.S. Supreme Court held that Spence’s conduct was protected expression
under the First Amendment because Spence had an intent to convey a particularized
message, a protest of the invasion of Cambodia and the Kent State shooting, and
because it was likely, given the context, that the message would be understood by
an audience.210 The Court found that there was no state interest strong enough to over-
come the First Amendment protection and therefore, reversed Spence’s conviction.211
202 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 659:35, I (2016).
203 See O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 376; see supra text accompanying notes 182–200.
204 Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410–11 (1974) (per curiam).
205 See id. at 413–14 n.8.
206 418 U.S. 405, 409–10 (1974).
207 See WASH. REV. CODE § 9.86.020 (2016) (“No person shall, in any manner, for ex-
hibition or display: (a) Place or cause to be placed any word, figure, mark, picture, design,
drawing or advertisement of any nature upon any flag, standard, color, ensign or shield of
the United States or of this state . . . or (b) Expose to public view any such flag, standard,
color, ensign or shield upon which shall have been printed, painted, or otherwise produced,
or to which shall have been attached, appended, affixed or annexed any such word, figure,
mark, picture, design, drawing or advertisement . . . .”).
208 Spence, 418 U.S. at 406.
209 Id. at 408.
210 Id. at 410–11.
211 Id. at 413–15.
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In New Hampshire, really only one of the three plaintiffs’ actions, Andrew
Langlois, the voter who wrote in the name of his dog,212 would likely qualify as
expressive speech without the caption on the photo. He voted for his dog because he did
not like any of the candidates on the ballot,213 and it is likely that the audience, his
Facebook friends, who saw a photo of his marked ballot would understand his
message. Once his conduct would qualify as expressive, New Hampshire would
have to show a compelling interest to limit the speech under RSA 659:3d, I.214 As
stated previously, the District Court erred in holding that New Hampshire did not
have a compelling interest in prohibiting the posting of ballot selfies, given the
robust American history of vote buying and voter coercion, both of which still
occur,215 and the precedent set by Burson v. Freeman.216
For the other two plaintiffs, both candidates who voted for themselves, the
expressive speech test might fail on its own. Although both plaintiffs had the intent
to convey a particularized message, protest of New Hampshire’s law, it is unclear
given the facts on the record that it would have been sufficiently likely that their
message of protest would have been understood by their audience. This is especially
true for plaintiff Brandon Ross because his caption of “[c]ome at me, bro”217 is just
cryptic enough for a member of his Facebook audience to be unsure of why he
posted the photo of his ballot with that particular caption. Though the expressive
speech test set forth in Spence would not work by itself for Leon Rideout and Ross,
both of their actions would still fall under the O’Brien test, allowing the state of
New Hampshire’s prohibition on posting ballot selfies on social media to stand.218
V. BALLOT SELFIES AND CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS
A. Buckley v. Valeo and Exacting Scrutiny
Although the O’Brien test is a means for New Hampshire to avoid the need for
strict scrutiny under the U.S. Supreme Court’s new definition of content-based
speech set forth in Reed v. Town of Gilbert,219 the possibility still exists for the U.S.
212 Rideout v. Gardner, 123 F. Supp. 3d 218, 226–27 (D.N.H. 2015).
213 Id. at 227.
214 Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 197 (1992) (“[T]he government may regulate the
time, place, and manner of . . . expressive activity, so long as such restrictions are content-
neutral, are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and leave open
ample alternatives for communication.”).
215 See supra text accompanying notes 19–60.
216 504 U.S. at 199.
217 Rideout, 123 F. Supp. 3d at 227.
218 See United States v. O’Brien, 291 U.S. 367, 376–77 (1968) (explaining that the O’Brien
test is appropriate when speech and nonspeech elements are present).
219 See 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2227 (2015) (defining content based regulations as a regulation that
“applies to particular speech because of the topic discussed or the idea or message expressed”).
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Supreme Court to clarify its shift from the old definition of content-based and
content-neutral restrictions. Were the Court to make this kind of clarification, given
the intent of the New Hampshire legislature in amending RSA 659:35, I,220 the law
could be analyzed using the exacting scrutiny test used in Buckley v. Valeo.221
Buckley was the first major campaign finance case, and it set the standard the U.S.
Supreme Court has used to evaluate campaign finance legislation—the threat of quid
pro quo corruption or the appearance thereof.222
After the Watergate scandal, Congress passed the Federal Election Campaign
Act Amendments (FECA) of 1974.223 FECA set limits on contributions to federal
candidates and political parties, as well as limits on independent expenditures and
candidate expenditures.224 All of the contribution and expenditure limits were chal-
lenged in Buckley v. Valeo, and the Court ultimately upheld the contribution limits
but found that the expenditure limits were unconstitutional.225
In upholding the contribution limits, the Buckley Court recognized that “[e]ven
a ‘”significant interference” with protected rights of political association’ may be
sustained if the State demonstrates a sufficiently important interest and employs
means closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgment of associational freedoms.”226
The Court ultimately held that there is a sufficiently important governmental interest
in preventing quid pro quo corruption and the appearance thereof in setting contribu-
tion limits, because allowing unlimited contributions might lead to some sort of
favorable response from the candidate.227 Even though contribution limits lead to
some chilling of First Amendment political speech, the interest in preventing quid
pro quo corruption justifies the chilling effect.228
The primary purpose of the FECA, and the constitutionally sufficient justifica-
tion of preventing quid pro quo corruption,229 is similar to New Hampshire’s interest
in wanting to prohibit the posting of photos of marked ballots on social media—voter
coercion and vote buying and quid pro quo corruption are ultimately two sides of
the same coin. The worry with quid pro quo corruption is that a candidate is getting
paid by a voter in an effort to advance the voter’s preferred policy objectives.230 The
220 Rideout, 123 F. Supp. 3d at 222.
221 424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976) (per curiam).
222 Id. at 25.
223 Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 2, 5, 18, 26, and 47 U.S.C.).
224 Federal Law, CAMPAIGN FIN. INST., http://www.cfinst.org/law/federal.aspx [http://
perma.cc/58UD-7AC7].
225 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 143.
226 Id. at 25.
227 Id. at 26–27.
228 Id. at 27.
229 See id. at 26–27; supra note 224.
230 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 227–28.
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worry with voter coercion and vote buying is similar—the candidate is paying the
voter to vote for him or her in an effort to win the election. Either way, money
exchanges hands in the interest of electing a certain candidate, so regulations of both
contributions and voter coercion and vote buying should be scrutinized similarly.
B. “Novelty and Plausibility”
The Court has used the interest in preventing quid pro quo corruption and the
appearance thereof time and time again to uphold contribution limits. Other U.S.
Supreme Court cases lend credence to the idea that quid pro quo corruption and vote
buying and voter coercion are more similar than they are different.231 In Nixon v.
Shrink Missouri Government PAC,232 the U.S. Supreme Court upheld Missouri’s
contribution limits, extending Buckley to apply to state, as well as federal laws.233
The Shrink Missouri Court applied the Buckley test, checking to see if Missouri’s law
was a “means ‘closely drawn’ to match a ‘sufficiently important interest . . . .’”234
The Shrink Missouri Court went on to quote United States v. Mississippi Generating
Co.235 in saying that “[d]emocracy works ‘only if the people have faith in those who
govern, and that faith is bound to be shattered when high officials and their appoint-
ees engage in activities which arouse suspicions of malfeasance and corruption.’”236
This applies to the problems of vote buying and voter coercion as well—even if very
few voters participate in vote-buying schemes, the fact that there are “suspicions of
malfeasance and corruption”237 surrounding those schemes that would be implicated
when voters begin posting photos of their marked ballots online should be enough
to survive a test similar to Buckley’s “closely drawn”238 standard.239
Additionally, the Shrink Missouri Court noted that “[t]he quantum of empirical
evidence needed to satisfy heightened judicial scrutiny of legislative judgments will
vary . . . with the novelty and plausibility of the justification raised . . .”240 and that “the
State presented an affidavit from . . . the co-chair of the state legislature’s Interim
Joint Committee on Campaign Finance Reform . . . who stated that large contributions
231 See infra notes 232–58 and accompanying text (discussing how wealthy individuals
attempt to use their money to “influence governmental action”).
232 528 U.S. 377 (2000).
233 Id. at 381–82.
234 Id. at 378 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25).
235 United States v. Miss. Valley Generating Co., 364 U.S. 520 (1961).
236 Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. at 390 (quoting Miss. Valley Generating Co., 364
U.S. at 562).
237 Id.
238 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976) (per curiam).
239 See id. (describing the “closely drawn” standard).
240 Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. at 391.
2016] BUT FIRST, (DON’T) LET ME TAKE A SELFIE 367
have ‘the real potential to buy votes . . . .’”241 This is ultimately a similar scenario to the
circumstances in New Hampshire when RSA 659:35, I was amended.242
The “novelty and plausibility”243 of vote buying and voter coercion in New
Hampshire is something worth considering. Because New Hampshire does not have
its own history of vote buying and voter coercion through the sorts of vote-buying
schemes seen in other states,244 but because there is a robust history of vote buying
and voter coercion in the United States245 the lack of novelty of the issue indicates
that the amount of empirical evidence might not need to be as much as the District
Court thought was necessary in Rideout v. Gardner.246 Further, the fact that vote-
buying schemes still occur throughout the country indicates that the plausibility of
it happening in New Hampshire is high as well. The affidavit from the co-chair of
the state legislature’s Interim Joint Committee on Campaign Finance Reform is,
admittedly, more substantial than the legislative history surrounding the amended
RSA 659:35, I,247 but, ultimately, the recognition that “large contributions have ‘the
real potential to buy votes,’”248 and the anecdotal evidence that there was a vote-
buying scheme in a recent New Hampshire election249 are similar in that they both
recognize a problem that can be resolved through state legislative action.
Even in McCutcheon v. FEC,250 the case that eliminated the aggregate contribu-
tion limit,251 the Court recognized that there was
no need . . . to revisit Buckley’s distinction between contribu-
tions and expenditures and the corollary distinction in the appli-
cable standards of review. Buckley held that the Government’s
interest in preventing quid pro quo corruption or its appearance
was “sufficiently important . . .”; we have elsewhere stated that
the same interest may be properly labeled “compelling,” . . . so
that the interest would satisfy even strict scrutiny.252
241 Id. at 393 (quoting Shrink Mo. Gov’t Pac v. Adams, 5 F. Supp. 2d 734, 738 (1998)).
242 See Rideout v. Gardner, 123 F. Supp. 3d. 218, 223–24 (D.N.H. 2015) (describing the
vote-buying circumstances in New Hampshire’s history).
243 Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. at 391.
244 See, e.g., United States v. Thomas, 510 F.3d 714, 717 (7th Cir. 2007); United States
v. Shatley, 448 F.3d 264, 265 (4th Cir. 2006); United States v. Johnson, No. 5:11-CR-143,
2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117777, at *1–5 (E.D. Ky. Aug. 21, 2012) (discussing vote-buying
schemes in various states).
245 See supra text accompanying notes 19–60.
246 123 F. Supp. 3d at 235.
247 Id. at 224.
248 Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. at 393.
249 Rideout, 123 F. Supp. 3d at 224.
250 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014) (plurality opinion).
251 Id. at 1436–37.
252 Id. at 1445 (quoting FEC v. Nat’l Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480,
496–97 (1985); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 26–27 (1976) (per curiam)).
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The “elsewhere” that the Court is referring to is FEC v. National Conservative
Political Action Committee.253 In this case, the U.S. Supreme Court used the “com-
pelling governmental interests” language in evaluating whether independent expen-
ditures by political committees were constitutional.254 Though the Court was looking
at expenditures rather than contributions, the use of “compelling governmental
interests” and “narrowly tailored” in the Court’s analysis shows that there is a
compelling interest to be found in preventing quid pro quo corruption,255 which
further suggests that an appropriately tailored statute addressing contributions (rather
than expenditures) could survive strict scrutiny. This indicates, in turn, that it should
be possible for New Hampshire’s prohibition on posting ballot selfies to social
media to withstand the kind of scrutiny that is applied to campaign contributions.
The McCutcheon Court went on to note that regardless of whether the Court
applies strict scrutiny or the “closely drawn” Buckley test, “[they] must assess the
fit between the stated governmental objective and the means selected to achieve that
objective. Or to put it another way, if a law that restricts political speech does not
‘avoid unnecessary abridgment’ of First Amendment rights, it cannot survive
‘rigorous’ review.”256 In extending this logic to New Hampshire’s prohibition on
posting ballot selfies to social media, the same test would apply. New Hampshire’s
RSA 659:35, I is able to “avoid unnecessary abridgment”257 of First Amendment
rights by leaving open ample alternative avenues of speech regarding one’s actions
at the voting booth. It is only meant to address and prevent the potential of people
posting evidence publicly of how they voted in an effort to prevent vote-buying
schemes from coming to fruition. Without the sort of proof or receipt that a ballot
selfie provides, it would be impossible to be certain of how a voter actually voted,
which makes an effective vote-buying scheme nearly impossible to enact. Because
that is all that New Hampshire’s prohibition on ballot selfies is meant to achieve, there
is no better way for the state to prevent the “proof of purchase” necessary for ef-
fective vote-buying schemes, which means that although there is some abridgment of
voters’ First Amendment rights, it is not unnecessary, which would allow RSA 659:35,
I to survive the sort of rigorous scrutiny used for campaign finance legislation.258
In sum, should the U.S. Supreme Court clarify its change in the definitions of
content-neutral and content-based speech, there would be an entirely different means
for analyzing New Hampshire’s prohibition on posting ballot selfies to social media.
This is because there is a strong similarity between the governmental interests in
253 470 U.S. 480.
254 Id. at 496–97.
255 McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1438.
256 Id. at 1445–46 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25).
257 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976) (per curiam).
258 See McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1446 (laying out the “unnecessary abridgment” standard
that prevents a statute from passing “rigorous review”).
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preventing vote buying and voter coercion and the interests in preventing quid pro
quo corruption implicated in the campaign finance cases. From Buckley’s “closely
drawn” standard259 and the “compelling governmental interests” and “narrowly
tailored” language used in McCutcheon260 and National Conservative Political
Action Committee,261 to the “novelty and plausibility” language used in Shrink
Missouri Government PAC,262 New Hampshire’s prohibition on ballot selfies fits in
comfortably to the Supreme Court’s analysis of capping campaign contributions.263
This good fit is partially because quid pro quo corruption and vote buying and voter
coercion are ultimately not that different.
CONCLUSION
This Note addressed a variety of litigation strategies that would lead a court to
uphold RSA 659:35, I and allow New Hampshire to continue prohibiting the posting
of ballot selfies on social media, including a more accurate strict scrutiny analysis,264
the O’Brien test,265 the expressive speech test,266 and the exacting scrutiny analysis
used in campaign finance cases.267 While the First Circuit evaluated the statute using
intermediate scrutiny,268 analyzing the law using the O’Brien test, the expressive
speech test, and the exacting scrutiny used in the campaign finance cases still
provide alternative means of framing RSA 659:35, I.269 The best approach, given the
current state of content-based and content-neutral analysis, is strict scrutiny, but
New Hampshire should be able to successfully argue that its prohibition on ballot
selfies can withstand strict scrutiny. With the 2016 presidential election fast ap-
proaching, this will be the first time voters will enter the voting booths with the
knowledge that they can, in fact, take photos of their marked ballots, so it is worth
considering the consequences that this might have on the electoral process.
The district court’s decision to overturn the prohibition on ballot selfies and
allow voters to post photos of their marked ballots on social media is likely to have
some sort of consequence on how people perceive the electoral process in New
Hampshire.270 In voter ID cases, for instance, states have successfully argued that
259 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25.
260 McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1445.
261 FEC v. Nat’l Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 496–97 (1985).
262 Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 391 (2000).
263 See supra notes 223–62 and accompanying text.
264 See supra Part II.
265 See supra Part III.
266 See supra Part IV.
267 See supra Part V.
268 See supra Part III.
269 See supra Parts IV, V.
270 See Dave Solomon, Judge Strikes Down NH Ballot Selfie Ban, N.H. UNION LEADER
(Aug. 11, 2015, 9:10 AM), http://www.unionleader.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20150811
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voter ID laws help promote confidence in the electoral system by preventing voter
fraud.271 Similarly, an explosion of ballot selfies would likely lead to a decrease in
voter confidence and an increase in fears of vote buying and voter coercion.
Social media is extremely pervasive today, and most (if not all) campaigns, both
at the federal and the state level, have some sort of presence on platforms like
Facebook and Twitter.272 Though both services provide a form of public communi-
cations, they each also have their own means of privately or directly messaging an
account.273 RSA 659:35, I provides that voters cannot take “a digital image or
photograph of his or her marked ballot and [distribute or share] the image via social
media or by any other means.”274 All three plaintiffs in Rideout v. Gardner posted
their photos publicly on Facebook, and the district court opinion only contemplated
the kind of public postings displayed by the plaintiffs.275 However, there would
really be no way to know if voters are directly or privately messaging photos of their
marked ballots to campaign officials in exchange for money. With the use of a
service like PayPal,276 the entire exchange could be kept completely secret, only
known to the campaign officials running the vote-buying scheme and the voters they
convinced to participate.
With these very real concerns in mind, New Hampshire’s interest in preventing
vote buying and voter coercion becomes very real, and is no longer the kind of
interest in the abstract that the district court held was not compelling enough to
allow the statute to survive strict scrutiny.277 Though there is no evidence that this
sort of vote-buying scheme has been orchestrated in New Hampshire yet, a clear
/NEWS06/150819784 [http://perma.cc/8EYU-WWC5] (discussing the repercussions of the
district court’s decision to overturn the “ballot selfie” ban).
271 See generally Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 202–03 (2008)
(quoting Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434, 439 (1992)).
272 See, e.g., Hillary Clinton, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/hillaryclinton [http://
perma.cc/GB5W-4D89]; Donald Trump, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/Donald
Trump [http://perma.cc/4LTS-FHEF]; Bernie Sanders (@SenSanders), TWITTER, http://www
.twitter.com/BernieSanders [http://perma.cc/N6GM-PHGW]; Ted Cruz (@tedcruz), TWITTER,
http://www.twitter.com/tedcruz [http://perma.cc/U3UC-VJ8N].
273 See How Do I Send a Private Message to a Page?, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook
.com/help/142031279233975 [http://perma.cc/VTK5-S4A5]; Let’s Speak Privately, TWITTER,
https://about.twitter.com/directmessages [http://perma.cc/3TN8-2YGT].
274 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 659:35, I (2016).
275 See 123 F. Supp. 3d 218, 226–27 (D.N.H. 2015) (describing each plaintiff’s conduct
in connection with their “ballot selfie”).
276 See Steven Swinford, Ebay and Paypal Users Face Huge Tax Crackdown, TELEGRAPH
(July 24, 2015, 7:30 AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/tax/income-tax/ebay-and-paypal-users
-face-huge-tax-crackdown/ [http://perma.cc/GLG4-KQYE]. PayPal is an online electronic
payment provider that enables people and businesses to pay for goods and services online.
Id. Government concern about PayPal is that the government has no way to track what people
buy. Id.
277 See Rideout, 123 F. Supp. 3d. at 232 (reviewing the district court’s language in re-
jecting the government’s asserted interest).
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example of how it would occur, combined with the argument that vote buying and
voter coercion would cause a decrease in confidence in the electoral system, should
be enough of a concrete compelling interest for the state.
A clear example of how this kind of vote-buying scheme would occur would
also resolve any concerns regarding the overly broad nature of the statute. Although
the plaintiffs successfully argued that RSA 659:35, I was overly broad because it
encapsulated what should be protected political speech,278 interpreting the statute’s
language on social media to include private and direct messaging rebuts the presump-
tion that the state was trying to limit protected speech under the First Amendment.
While this was not addressed on appeal, had New Hampshire been able to show
that it is possible for campaigns to engage in vote-buying schemes on social media,
it might have been enough for the First Circuit to reverse the district court’s decision
and reinstate the prohibition on posting ballot selfies.279 This kind of strategy worked
for the voter ID law in Indiana where there were no documented instances of in-
person voter fraud.280 Because the state was able to show that in-person voter fraud
has occurred historically, with occasional instances occurring more recently, the
U.S. Supreme Court upheld the law.281
As evidenced earlier in this Note, there is a long history of voter coercion and
vote buying in the United States, as well as examples of vote-buying schemes
occurring well into the twenty-first century.282 The most recent prosecuted case of
vote buying occurred in 2010, two years after President Obama’s incredibly success-
ful social media campaign.283 After President Obama’s social media campaign was
so successful, other candidates, on both the local and the federal level, have emu-
lated his strategy.284 All of the major (and many minor) candidates in the 2016
presidential race, for instance, have an active Facebook and Twitter presence,285
which provides a myriad of opportunities for engaging with voters both publicly and
privately. And because New Hampshire is a crucial state during both the primary
and the general elections, it is possible that the state could be on the forefront of
entirely electronic vote-buying schemes. Because this is a very real concern, New
278 Id. at 234.
279 See Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 199 (1992) (stating that individuals have a right
to vote freely and states have a “compelling interest” in ensuring voters can vote freely).
280 Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 194–95 (2008).
281 Id. at 204.
282 See supra Part I.A.
283 See generally David Carr, How Obama Tapped into Social Networks’ Power, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 9, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/10/business/media/10carr.html?_r =1 (de-
tailing President Obama’s efforts to use social media to advance his political platform).
284 See supra note 272; see also Summer Concepcion, Who Wins the Social Media Mayor’s
Rce?, NBC CHI. (Apr. 6, 2015, 2:38 PM), http://www.nbcchicago.com/blogs/ward-room
/Social-Media-and-the-Mayors-Race-298798441.html [http://perma.cc/D4AF-RE7J].
285 See supra notes 272–73.
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Hampshire has a compelling interest in preventing voter coercion and vote buying
by prohibiting the posting of photos of marked ballots on social media.
EPILOGUE
On September 28, 2016, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
decided Rideout v. Gardner.286 The First Circuit’s opinion addressed the procedural
history of the case and the legislative history of RSA 659:35, I before determining
that “the statute at issue here is facially unconstitutional even applying only interme-
diate scrutiny.”287 The First Circuit noted that, to survive intermediate scrutiny, a
statute needs to be “narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest.”288
Although the idea of preventing vote buying and voter coercion is “compelling in
the abstract,”289 that sort of interest is not enough for the statute to survive intermedi-
ate scrutiny. The First Circuit also found that the statute was not narrowly tailored
because the ballot selfie ban impacts all voters, not just those engaged in vote buy-
ing schemes.290 Further, the State did not show that other laws prohibiting voter
corruption were not sufficient to prevent vote buying and voter coercion.291
The First Circuit’s decision to apply intermediate, rather than strict, scrutiny to
RSA 659:35, I is interesting, because it suggests that the court views the statute as
content-neutral and not content-based, even under Reed v. Town of Gilbert.292 As this
Note suggests, Reed v. Town of Gilbert changed the analysis of content-neutral and
content-based regulations, expanding the definition of content-neutral regulations.293
Under this expanded definition, the district court appropriately analyzed the statute
using strict scrutiny, because the statute “restricts speech on the basis of its subject
matter.”294 Because the First Circuit applied intermediate scrutiny, this could be an
opportunity, should New Hampshire petition for a writ of certiorari, for the Supreme
Court to reevaluate the scrutiny definitions established in Reed v. Town of Gilbert
and apply any one of the levels of scrutiny discussed in this Note to determine that
RSA 659:35, I is, in fact, constitutional.
286 Rideout v. Gardner, No. 15-2021, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 17622 (1st Cir. Sept. 28, 2016).
287 Id. at *13.
288 Id. at *14 (quoting McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2534 (2014)).
289 Id. (quoting Rideout v. Gardner, 123 F. Supp. 3d 218, 231 (D.N.H. 2015)).
290 Id. at *19.
291 Id. at *18–19.
292 See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015).
293 See supra notes 83–92 and accompanying text.
294 Rideout, 123 F. Supp. 3d at 229.
